The idea that each rational soul is created directly by God is the keystone of Thomas Aquinas' conception of human beings. Whether it is a philosophical idea, consistent with Thomas' own philosophical principles, or rather a merely theological thesis that introduces a Deus ex machina to solve problems arising from the hybrid ontological status that the human soul enjoys in Thomas' philosophical anthropology is a question that I will try to answer in this essay.
Let us start by explaining why we think that the creation of the soul is the keystone of Thomas' anthropology. From the very beginning of his career, Thomas wanted to demonstrate the compatibility of two theses: the ontological unity of the human being and the immortality of the soul, a project that he shared with most of his colleagues, theologians and philosophers alike, around the middle of the thirteenth century. He thought, initially, that the solution to his problem could be found in the doctrine, common amongst many of his contemporaries, according to which the human soul is the last of the intellectual substances created by God (its rank, determined by its distance from the Pure Act or First Cause, is understood then as a degree of potentiality).
1 However low its rank may be, the soul is nonetheless a first substance, a hypostasis or suppositum (individual subject), the intellectual essence of which is complete without matter; because it is a complete substance, the soul can be the absolute subject of the act of being; because it has the lowest rank in the hierarchy of intellectual b. carlos bazÁn substances, it can be united to a body as a form: anima est substantia et forma.
2 Such a simple substance is naturally incorruptible because matter is the only principle of corruptibility.
3 The theory, then, provides a rational foundation to the immortality of the soul. And the low rank of the soul in the hierarchy of intellectual substances explains two characteristics that, though not being the specific difference of the soul (only its degree of potentiality is such difference), are however exclusive to the human soul: first, a capacity to share its being with a body (unibilitas), and then, an operational weakness that forces the soul to abstract the objects of intellection from sensible data. 4 To prevent anyone from drawing the conclusion that the union of the soul with the body is purely operational and the even more embarrasing inference, based on a principle that Thomas has accepted, 5 namely that if the soul is a simple substance, it could only be one in its species ( 4 Cf. In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1, art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 104: "quia plurimum de possibilitate habet, esse suum est adeo propinquum rebus materialibus ut corpus materiale illud esse possit participare, dum anima corpori unitur ad unum esse". Cf. ibid., q. 3, art. 3 ad 1, p. 121: "intellectus humanus est ultimus in gradu substantiarum intellectualium; et ideo est in eo maxima possibilitas respectu aliarum substantiarum intellectualium [. . .] unde lumen intellectuale in eo receptum non est sufficiens ad determinandum propriam rei cognitionem, nisi per species a rebus receptas".
